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to consider the effect its decision would have as a 
precedent.”4
Conditional Uses 
In Robert E. Havell Revocable Trust v. Zoning 
Board of Appeals of Village of Monroe,5 the Second 
Department reversed the lower court, and affi rmed the 
ZBA, holding that the ZBA’s determination that the 
applicant’s use of the property for tire sales and related 
services was a conditional use, rather than a use permit-
ted as right, was not illegal, arbitrary and capricious, or 
an abuse of discretion. 
The court ruled that the Supreme Court erred when 
it disregarded the full administrative record submitted 
by the ZBA on the ground that it was uncertifi ed and 
granted the petition. The court explained that “[s]ince 
there was no allegation or indication that a substantial 
right of the petitioner was prejudiced by the lack of a 
certifi cation, the Supreme Court should have disregard-
ed the defect, and decided the matter on the merits.”6
The court went on to address the merits, conclud-
ing that the ZBA’s determination was consistent with 
the applicable zoning code notwithstanding an ambi-
guity in the code. The code specifi cally listed “repair 
service, including automotive” as uses permitted as of 
right and “tire sales and service” as conditional uses. 
The code provided, however, that “in the event of 
confl ict in the terminology of any section or part thereof 
of this chapter, the more restrictive provisions shall con-
trol.”7 Thus, the court confi rmed the ZBA’s determina-
tion that the proposed use of the properties for tire sales 
was a conditional use. 
Nonconforming Use 
In TAC Peek Equities, Ltd. v. Town of Putnam Zon-
ing Board of Appeals,8 the Second Department ruled 
that a property did not lose its nonconforming-use sta-
tus due to inactivity. The petitioners had appealed the 
denial of a permit to operate an automotive repair shop 
on their property. The court began by explaining that 
the trial court had erred in transferring the proceeding 
to the appellate court pursuant to CPLR § 7804(g), be-
cause the determination to be reviewed was not made 
after a trial-type hearing at which evidence was taken 
and was therefore not subject to substantial evidence 
review. The court went on to consider the merits, how-
ever, for the sake of judicial economy. 
The court then ruled that the ZBA determination 
that the petitioner’s property had lost its nonconform-
ing-use status as an automotive repair shop did not 
have a rational basis. The relevant zoning code provides 
that a nonconforming-use status is lost when such non-
This update summa-
rizes New York cases related 
to land use and zoning that 
were decided in the fi rst half 
of 2015.1 The courts (and 
the litigants) sure have been 
busy.
Accessory Structures 
In Sacher v. Village of 
Old Brookville,2 the Second 
Department upheld the 
zoning board of appeals 
(ZBA) denial of variances for an accessory structure. 
Following the denial by the ZBA of the Village of 
Old Brookville of an application for setback and area 
variances for a second-story addition to an accessory 
building, and an affi rmance by the trial court, the ap-
pellate court affi rmed the trial court’s judgment that 
the fi nding of the zoning board that the detriment to 
the community outweighed the benefi t of granting the 
requested variances had a rational basis in the record 
and was not arbitrary and capricious.
The court reiterated that the statutory test requires 
a ZBA, in determining whether to grant an area vari-
ance, to engage in a balancing test, weighing the benefi t 
to the applicant against the detriment to the health, 
safety, and welfare of the neighborhood or community 
if the variance is granted. In balancing the interests, the 
ZBA must consider 
1) whether an undesirable change will
be produced in the character of the 
neighborhood or a detriment to nearby 
properties will be created by the grant-
ing of the area variance; (2) whether 
the benefi t sought by the applicant can 
be achieved by some method, feasible 
for the applicant to pursue, other 
than an area variance; (3) whether the 
requested area variance is substantial; 
(4) whether the proposed variance will 
have an adverse effect or impact on 
the physical or environmental condi-
tions in the neighborhood or district; 
and (5) whether the alleged diffi culty 
was self-created, which consideration 
shall be relevant to the decision of the 
board of appeals, but shall not neces-
sarily preclude the granting of the area 
variance.3 
Further, the ZBA may consider personal observa-
tions of members of the ZBA and the ZBA is “entitled 
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Village of Mamaroneck and Building Inspector Robert 
Melillo pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The action arose 
from the legal requirements defendants imposed on the 
plaintiffs in connection with their efforts to repair their 
home in the aftermath of Hurricane Irene. The plaintiffs 
maintained that similarly situated homeowners were 
not subjected to the same treatment, which therefore 
constituted a violation of their equal protection and 
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The plaintiffs also alleged a Monell claim 
against the Village. The court dismissed these claims 
and gave the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint. 
The Amended Complaint raised equal protection, 
substantive due process, and procedural due process 
claims, along with a Monell claim against the Village as 
well as various claims for relief under state law.
The court granted the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss. First, as for the equal protection and selective 
enforcement claims, the court found that the plaintiffs 
failed to allege differential treatment from similarly 
situated individuals. Second, as for the due process 
claims, the court found that even if the plaintiffs had 
carried their burden of establishing the deprivation of 
a cognizable property interest, it was “doubtful” that 
the defendants’ acts were arbitrary, conscience-shock-
ing, or oppressive in the constitutional sense, and not 
merely incorrect or ill-advised. Finally, the court found 
that, because a Monell claim cannot be made absent an 
underlying constitutional violation, the plaintiffs Monell 
claim against the Village must also fail because a § 1983 
claim can only be brought against a municipality if the 
action that is alleged to be unconstitutional was the 
result of an offi cial policy or custom, which was not the 
case here.
RLUIPA 
On March 27, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York ruled in Bernstein v. 
Wesley Hills16 that four villages’ litigation of a town’s 
SEQRA review was not actionable under the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 
granting summary judgment in favor of all defendants 
in the consolidated action. The plaintiffs in this case (re-
ligious corporations and individuals affi liated with the 
Chofetz Chaim sect of Orthodox Judaism) alleged that 
the four villages within the Town of Ramapo discrimi-
nated against them by attempting to stop development 
of a proposed religious educational center and multi-
family housing development and by colluding to bring 
a separate 2004 action (the “Chestnut Ridge Action”). 
The Villages prevailed on their SEQRA claims in the 
separate Chestnut Ridge Action at the trial court level, 
but lost at the Appellate Division.
In a grueling 76-page opinion, the court in Bern-
stein found that, because the plaintiffs’ claim rested 
primarily on the Villages’ alleged collusion to bring the 
Chestnut Ridge Action, the plaintiffs’ claims depended 
conforming use “is inactive or ceases…for a continu-
ous period of more than two years.”9 The court found 
that contrary to the ZBA’s contention, the minimal 
extent of the nonconforming use in this case did not 
constitute either inactivity or cessation for the requisite 
time period, because there had been some automotive 
repair activity during that time. The court granted the 
petition as against the ZBA without costs, annulled 
the ZBA determination, and remitted the matter to the 
building inspector to issue the requested permit. 
Open Meetings 
In Ballard v. New York Safety Track, LLC,10 the 
Third Department affi rmed the Supreme Court ruling 
that the Town committed violations of the Open Meet-
ings Law when the Planning Board went into executive 
session on several occasions leading up to the execu-
tion of the 2013 agreement discussed above. The court 
explained that 
“While a governing body may enter 
into an executive session, it may do so 
only for certain purposes, including, 
as is relevant here, the consideration 
of an appointment or to engage in pri-
vate discussions relating to proposed 
or pending litigation. However, the 
body must “identify the subject matter 
to be discussed…with some degree of 
particularity.”11
The court rejected the Town’s claim that any 
discussion of the 2013 agreement was protected by 
the attorney-client privilege, because, the court noted, 
“the Planning Board’s inclusion of additional persons 
into the session necessarily eliminated any reasonable 
expectation of confi dentiality, effectively waiving any 
privilege attendant to such conversations.”12
The court also found that the Town’s insistence 
that it was not obliged to make the proposed 2013 
agreement available to petitioners before it was put to 
a vote “denied petitioners ‘any meaningful participa-
tion’ in the process leading to the fi nal adoption of the 
controversial 2013 agreement, in clear contravention of 
Public Offi cers Law § 103(e).”13 Additionally, the court 
found that the Town Clerk’s failure to make the min-
utes from a March 2013 Planning Board meeting avail-
able within “two weeks from the date” of the meeting 
was a violation of Public Offi cers Law § 106(3). On 
these bases, the court affi rmed the Supreme Court’s 
award of counsel fees and costs to the petitioners.14
Rebuilding and Equal Protection 
In Witt v. Village of Mamaroneck,15 the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim arising 
out of rebuilding efforts following Hurricane Irene. 
Plaintiff homeowners brought an action against the 
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Section 1983
In Sherman v. Town of Chester,23 the U.S. District 
Court for Southern District of New York denied in 
part and granted in part the Town’s motion to dismiss 
the plaintiff real estate developer’s retaliation claim, 
which was based on evidence that the plaintiff was 
singled out and “being suffocated with red tape,” but 
dismissed the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. Pending before 
the federal district court in this case was the Town’s 
renewed motion to dismiss following the Second 
Circuit’s reversal of the court’s determination that the 
plaintiff’s federal takings claim was unripe.
As a preliminary matter, the court noted that the 
plaintiff incorrectly relied on the Second Circuit’s 
conclusion that his takings claim constituted a continu-
ing violation when he asserted that each of his federal 
constitutional claims constituted a continuing violation. 
Relatedly, the plaintiff argued that the tolling provision 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) applied to his other federal claims 
because the prior litigation was voluntarily dismissed 
pursuant to FRCP 41. Although acknowledging an 
ambiguity in § 1367(d), the court nevertheless held that 
the tolling provision applies only to pendent claims 
dismissed pursuant to one of the four circumstances 
described in § 1367(c) and not, as plaintiff argued, to 
pendent claims dismissed for any other reason. 
As to the retaliation claim, the court held the plain-
tiff showed the requisite requirements for his claim to 
survive the Town’s motion to dismiss. For retaliation 
claims made under the First Amendment, the Sec-
ond Circuit requires that plaintiffs show only that the 
plaintiff’s conduct is protected under the First Amend-
ment and that the defendant’s conduct was motivated 
by or substantially caused by the plaintiff’s exercise 
of speech. The court concluded that the trial court’s 
opinion that the Town “singled out Sherman’s develop-
ment, suffocating him with red tape” over the course 
of a decade to “make sure he could never succeed in 
developing MareBrook” was suffi cient to show that the 
defendants’ conduct was motivated by or substantially 
caused by the plaintiff’s exercise of speech, and evi-
dence that the Town repeatedly refused the plaintiffs’ 
requests to enforce zoning codes over a nine-year pe-
riod was suffi cient to constitute a continuing violation. 
However, the plaintiff’s due process claims did not 
survive the motion to dismiss. They did not constitute 
a continuing violation because they were based on 
discrete acts by the Town that were readily discerned 
by Sherman at the time the acts were taken. Finally, 
with respect to the state law claims, because the claims 
concerned the exercise of discretionary acts, the Town 
was entitled to immunity. 
SEQRA 
On February 19, 2015, the Third Department ruled 
in Troy Sand & Gravel Co. Inc. v. Town of Nassau24 
on whether there was an equal protections violation. 
The court began by dismissing the plaintiffs’ conten-
tion that the Second Circuit’s decision in Fortress Bible 
Church v. Feiner17 eliminated the requirement that 
plaintiffs provide evidence of a similarly situated 
comparator because the defendants allegedly inap-
propriately employed SEQRA. Rejecting this claim, the 
court observed that Fortress Bible involved the question 
of when SEQRA review constitutes the implementation 
of a land use regulation under RLUIPA, not the ques-
tion of whether municipal defendants have qualifi ed 
immunity when pursuing First Amendment protected 
activity, such as the fi ling of a lawsuit.18
The court then found that the plaintiffs’ equal 
protection claims failed because the plaintiffs had not 
presented any evidence of a comparator development 
“similarly situated in all respects.”19 The court also 
noted that the plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of mate-
rial fact with respect to the Villages’ discriminatory 
intent, although the court did not question the sincerity 
of plaintiffs’ allegations.20
The court then considered the plaintiffs’ substan-
tial burden and nondiscrimination RLUIPA claims, 
explaining that the applicability of these claims hinged 
on two questions: (1) in fi ling the Chestnut Ridge Ac-
tion, did the defendants “impose or implement” a land 
use regulation, and (2) if not, did the defendants take 
a “government action” in violation of RLUIPA? The 
answer to each was “no.” 
With respect to whether the Villages’ initiation of a 
lawsuit challenging the Town’s SEQRA determination 
constituted a imposition or implementation of a land 
use regulation, the court explained,
There is a difference between imposing 
or implementing a land use regulation, 
and fi ling a lawsuit to ensure that an-
other municipality imposes or imple-
ments its own land use regulation.… 
[A] reading of RLUIPA [that implicates 
the latter circumstances] would ex-
pand its scope far beyond its intended 
targeting of the “widespread practice 
of individualized decisions to grant or 
refuse permission to use property for 
religious purposes,” to include govern-
ing any action a local government may 
take that could result in the enforce-
ment of a land use regulation.21
Additionally, because the Town was the “involved 
agency” under SEQRA that implemented and con-
trolled the SEQRA review of the development, the 
Town was the only entity that could have “implement-
ed” the regulation.22 
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The court held that the plaintiff established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the Town selective-
ly enforced the Town Code in violation of the plaintiff’s 
right to equal protection of the laws and in such a way 
as to interfere with his right to free speech, and award-
ed him compensatory damages. The court fi rst found 
that § 316.7 of the Town Code was content-neutral on 
its face because it regulated the size and number of 
signs permitted on certain property, and its applica-
tion was not dependent on the content of the sign. But, 
the court found that the plaintiff presented suffi cient 
credible evidence to show he was treated differently 
than his neighbor. The Town consistently and repeat-
edly enforced § 316.7 against plaintiff and did not bring 
any enforcement action against his neighbor despite 
two large signs posted on the neighbor’s property. The 
court found the totality of the circumstances suggested 
the offi cer acted with ill will and bad faith towards the 
plaintiff when he contacted the Sheriff’s Department. 
Between the drafting of this update and the publi-
cation of this issue, the U.S. Supreme Court is bound to 
issue its decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert.27 Depend-
ing on how the Court decides the case, municipalities 
may need to act quickly to amend their sign regula-
tions. For a detailed summary of the issues facing the 
Court, see Land Use Law Update: Will Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert Require Municipalities Throughout the Country to 
Rewrite Their Sign Codes?28
Special Exceptions
In Nathan v. Board of Appeals of Town of Hemp-
stead,29 the Appellate Division, Second Department, 
held that where the property the petitioners wished to 
use for a three-family residence did not meet the ap-
plicable lot-size requirements, the Board of Appeals cor-
rectly denied the petitioners’ application for a special 
exception permit. The court explained that a special ex-
ception granted by a zoning board gives permission to 
use property in a way that is consistent with the zoning 
regulation, although not necessarily allowed as of right. 
Thus, if, as here, the applicant failed to comply with 
any of the conditions set forth in the zoning ordinance, 
the zoning authority may deny the application. 
Takings
The following two cases, although not New York 
cases from 2015, highlight a tension many New York 
municipalities are feeling as they examine whether to 
provide greater protections of their coastal, riverine and 
estuarine areas in order to decrease fl ood risk—i.e., will 
the imposition of such protections constitute a taking, 
or will the failure to impose such protections constitute 
a taking?
In New Creek Bluebelt, Phase 4 v. City of New 
York,30 the imposition of such protections was a regula-
tory taking. There, the Second Department found a rea-
that, as an interested party, a town challenging a lead 
agency SEQRA determination is permitted to make 
its own fi ndings under SEQRA, but the town’s envi-
ronmental determination has to be based upon, and 
is constrained by, the record developed by the lead 
agency. This case involved the Town of Nassau’s ef-
forts to challenge the Department of Environmental 
Conservation’s (DEC) fi ndings as to the environmental 
impacts of a proposed commercial mining operation. 
For a thorough analysis of this case, see Lisa Cobb’s 
article, As an ‘Involved Agency,’ Independent SEQRA 
Findings Are Limited, supra at page 14.
Citizens for St. Patrick’s v. City of Watervliet,25 
discussed below under Standing and Other Jurisdic-
tional Hurdles, involved challenges by individuals 
who opposed a development to the City’s SEQRA 
and rezoning determinations. In 2012, defendant PCP 
Watervliet, LLC, a subsidiary of defendant Nigro 
Companies, purchased a parcel of property contain-
ing a church, school and rectory that were no longer in 
use in the City of Watervliet. Nigro petitioned the City 
Council to rezone the parcel from residential to com-
mercial, and, following public hearings, the City issued 
a negative declaration and amended its zoning map 
as requested. Individuals then brought a challenge 
alleging that the City failed to comply with SEQRA, 
engaged in illegal spot zoning and violated the Open 
Meetings Law. 
The Third Department held that the plaintiffs’ 
challenges to the SEQRA determination were moot 
because the plaintiffs did not seek any injunctive relief 
from the Court during the pendency of the appeal, 
and the church buildings had been demolished and a 
grocery store was fully constructed and operational on 
the property. 
Sign Ordinances 
In Beck v. Town of Groton,26 the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of New York found that a 
Town’s selective application of its sign ordinance was 
unconstitutional. Article 3 section 316.7 of the Town 
Code permitted a maximum of two signs of up to fi fty 
square feet in size on property zoned Rural–Agricul-
tural (“RA”). In early 2009, the plaintiff began erecting 
large signs on his property, which was zoned RA and 
included approximately eight-tenths of a mile of front-
age along Route 222 in Groton, New York.
When the Code Enforcement Offi cer of the Town 
contacted the plaintiff and requested that he remove 
the signage in violation of § 316.7, the plaintiff refused. 
The Offi cer responded with a “Notice of Violation” 
and, because the signage made mention of the Offi cer 
by name accompanied with swastikas, a criminal mis-
chief complaint.
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by basing liability in large part on the Corps’ negligent 
expansion and failure to maintain MR-GO, the court es-
sentially expanded the Takings Clause to include negli-
gent damage of private property by government failure 
to act. Because the case involved negligent design and 
maintenance, it leaves open the question of whether a 
government entity could be liable for failure to act in 
the face of foreseeable risks.
Standing and Other Jurisdictional Hurdles 
In LaRocca v. Department of Planning, Environ-
ment, and Development of Town of Brookhaven,35 the 
Second Department affi rmed the lower court ruling 
that dismissed the applicant’s claim for failure to ex-
haust administrative remedies. The applicant had com-
menced a proceeding under Article 78 of the New York 
Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) seeking review 
of the denial of his application for a building permit 
by the Building Department. However, the applicant 
had failed to appeal to the ZBA prior to seeking judicial 
intervention and failed to establish that an exception 
to the exhaustion doctrine was applicable. As a result, 
he failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. 
Accordingly, the court found that the lower court 
properly granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss 
the petition.
In a March 2015 decision of the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York, Safe Harbor 
Retreat, LLC v. Town of East Hampton,36 the court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s Fair Housing Act and Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act claims as unripe because 
the plaintiff failed to apply for a required permit and 
instead appealed the determination that a permit was 
required. 
Plaintiff Safe Harbor Retreat, LLC had proposed an 
“executive retreat” for persons suffering from alcohol-
ism and other forms of substance addiction. The town’s 
senior building inspector determined that Safe Harbor 
met the criteria of “functioning as a family unit” and 
therefore permitted in a residential zone without site 
plan approval. As a result, Safe Harbor claims that it 
expended signifi cant funds and effort to establish the 
community residence. After a period in which public 
offi cials and others visited and praised the community 
residence, a competitor complained about it and local 
opposition groups formed. The building inspector then 
reversed his position, informing Safe Harbor that it was 
operating an unauthorized “Semi–Public Facility, in 
a residential district,” and that, pursuant to the town 
code, a special permit was required. However, rather 
than seeking a special permit from the town’s planning 
board, Safe Harbor fi led an application with the ZBA 
to appeal the determination.37 The ZBA held a hearing 
on the application and entered an order affi rming the 
building inspector’s determination that Safe Harbor 
was operating a semi-public facility in a residential 
district and therefore a special use permit was required.
sonable probability that the city’s wetlands designation 
was a regulatory taking under Penn Central. Although 
the claimants proved only an 82% diminution of value 
(“a diminution which, standing alone, is within the 
range generally found to be insuffi cient to constitute a 
regulatory taking”), 
the parties agree[d] that, because of 
the wetlands regulations, it is highly 
improbable that the New York State 
Department of Environmental Conser-
vation would issue a permit to devel-
op the property in accordance with the 
applicable R3-1 zoning, which allows 
for attached and semi-attached one- 
and two- family dwellings, and that, 
accordingly, the highest and best use 
of the property is to leave it undevel-
oped and vacant. Thus, although the 
purpose of the wetlands regulations 
benefi ts the public good by providing 
fl ood prevention and mitigation, the 
wetlands regulations effectively pre-
vent any economically benefi cial use of 
the property.
Thus, the court agreed with the trial court that 
the 82% property value diminution together with the 
effective prohibition on development of any part of the 
property was suffi cient to establish a reasonable prob-
ability that the imposition of the wetlands regulations 
constituted a regulatory taking of the property.
But, in the possibly anomalous case of St. Bernard 
Parish Government v. United States,31 a municipality’s 
failure to adequately prevent fl ooding constituted a 
temporary taking under Arkansas Game & Fish Com-
mission v. United States.32 In St. Bernard Parish, the court 
ruled that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ failure to 
properly maintain the Mississippi River–Gulf Outlet 
(MR-GO), a seventy-six mile long navigational channel 
constructed, expanded and operated by the Corps, re-
sulted in a taking of private property without just com-
pensation in violation of the Takings Clause. The court 
found that the Corps’ negligent design and failure to 
maintain the MR-GO exacerbated fl ood damage from 
Hurricane Katrina and several subsequent storms, and, 
although temporary, wrongfully deprived landowners 
of the use of their property. 
According to the court, to prove a temporary tak-
ing, a plaintiff must show: (1) a protectable property 
interest under state law; (2) the character of the prop-
erty and the owners’ “reasonable-investment backed 
expectations”; (3) foreseeability; (4) causation; and 
(5) substantiality.33 
The Fifth Circuit previously rejected tort theo-
ries of liability in the Katrina litigation as violative of 
governmental immunity.34 But, in St. Bernard’s Parish, 
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commenced the federal action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 against defendants Town of Southhampton, Town 
of Southhampton Planning Board, and the members of 
the Planning Board. The plaintiff also commenced two 
related state court proceedings pursuant to CPLR Ar-
ticle 78 to challenge the decisions of the Planning Board. 
On April 8, 2015, the court had ruled that members 
of the Planning Board were entitled to qualifi ed im-
munity and dismissed the complaint as against those 
individuals in their individual capacities. The court 
found the members of the Planning Board could not 
be deemed to have violated “clearly established law” 
under the Town Code. Furthermore, even if they could 
be deemed to have violated “clearly established law,” 
the court determined that their actions were objectively 
reasonable under the circumstances. In the same order, 
the court rejected the Defendants’ ripeness argument, 
fi nding that the resolutions issued by the Planning 
Board, which were not appealable to the Town’s ZBA, 
constituted “fi nal, defi nitive positions as to how it could 
use its property” suffi cient to establish the ripeness of 
its Equal Protection claim. 
Subsequently, the defendants moved for and the 
court granted reconsideration of the April 8 order. The 
defendants argued on reconsideration that the court 
misapprehended their ripeness argument and, alterna-
tively, that the court’s qualifi ed immunity ruling was 
erroneous. The court agreed that the claims were not 
ripe and therefore did not address the defendants’ argu-
ments on reconsideration regarding qualifi ed immunity. 
With respect to ripeness, the defendants had argued 
that an earlier order remitting one of the Article 78 
proceedings to the Planning Board for factual determi-
nations had rendered the action unripe. In more than 
one prior order, the court had rejected this argument, 
reasoning, in part, that because it has “held that the 
Article 78 proceedings do not render the present action 
[un]ripe, it follows that the specter of additional Article 
78 proceedings does not render an otherwise ripe claim 
unripe.”43 Upon reconsideration, the court agreed with 
the defendants that “it is not future Article 78 proceed-
ings that call this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction 
over this action into question. Rather, it is the future 
proceedings before the Planning Board, the administra-
tive agency with authority to resolve the Plaintiff’s site 
plan applications, that does so.”44
In holding that the claims were unripe, the court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that further efforts to 
obtain approval from the Planning Board were futile. 
The court noted that, in the land use context, the futility 
exception applies when the agency “lacks discretion to 
grant variances or has dug in its heels and made clear 
that all such applications will be denied.”45 The court 
also noted, however, that “courts in [the Second] Circuit 
have recognized that mere allegations of open hostility 
[are] not suffi cient to invoke the futility exception.”46 
The court found that because of Safe Harbor’s 
failure to seek a special permit, the Town had not 
rendered a fi nal decision regarding Safe Harbor’s use 
of its premises. For the same reason, the Town had 
not had the opportunity to make an accommodation 
through the Town’s “established procedures used 
to adjust the neutral policy in question.”38 Quoting 
Sunrise Detox, the court noted that “[a] federal lawsuit 
at this stage would inhibit the kind of give-and-take 
negotiation that often resolves land use problems, and 
would in that way impair or truncate a process that 
must be allowed to run its course.”39 Accordingly, the 
court found that the action was not ripe and dismissed 
it without prejudice.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York dismissed another Fair Housing Act claim in 
another March 2015 decision, Amityville Mobile Home 
Civic Association v. Town of Babylon.40 The court 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction and granted Rule 11 sanctions 
against plaintiffs’ counsel. 
Plaintiffs are Amityville Mobile Home Civic As-
sociation (AMHCA) and the residents of Frontier Park, 
a mobile home park. Defendant Frontier, a private 
developer, fi led an application with the Town, which 
the Town approved, to rezone the property from Mul-
tiple Residential to accommodate a mixed-use multi-
residential development. The Town then adopted a 
relocation plan, which provided relocation assistance 
funds ($20,000). The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that 
defendants violated numerous federal laws including 
the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Frontier contended and the court agreed that the 
case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction because the plaintiffs’ claims were based on 
the incorrect premise that the relocation plan required 
the residents to sign a release giving up their “rights” 
to the one-hundred affordable/workforce units in 
the new development. The complaint contained no 
allegations that any plaintiffs executed the documents 
associated with the Plan; nor did it allege that plaintiffs 
applied for the affordable/workforce housing units 
or were denied the units based upon their agreement 
to the Plan. The court found that the plaintiffs could 
not plausibly allege that execution of the Plan docu-
ments foreclosed any “right” to the affordable housing 
because the Plan contained no such provision.41
On May 8, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York dismissed 545 Halsey 
Lane Properties, LLC v. Town of Southampton42 on 
ripeness grounds. This case involves challenges of two 
decisions by the Planning Board regarding conditional 
approvals of the plaintiff’s applications for a building 
permit for the construction of a barn or barns on its 
property. The plaintiff 545 Halsey Lane Properties, LLC 
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store was fully constructed and operational on the 
property. The rezoning determination had also been 
superseded by the City’s adoption of a new zoning 
code in 2013, under which Nigro’s use of the parcel is 
permitted as of right, and the plaintiffs did not raise 
any challenge to the new code. 
For another disposition based on a lack of standing, 
see the discussion of Fund for Lake George, Inc. v. Town 
of Queensbury Zoning Bd. of Appeals50 under Vari-
ances below. 
Variances 
In Mimassi v. Town of Whitestown Zoning Bd. of 
Appeals51 the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, 
reversed the lower court’s denial of a petition to annul 
the ZBA’s denial of an application for an area variance 
and remitted the application to the ZBA for a de novo 
determination. The court began by rejecting the peti-
tioner’s argument that the determination of the ZBA 
was arbitrary and capricious because the Town failed 
to adhere to its precedent, fi nding instead that the 
petitioner failed to establish that a previous decision 
by the Town on another case was based on essentially 
the same facts as petitioner’s claim. However, the court 
held that the lower court’s denial of the petition was 
nevertheless error because the ZBA did not “weigh the 
benefi t to [petitioner] of granting the variance[] against 
any detriment to the health, safety and welfare of the 
neighborhood or community affected thereby, taking 
into account the fi ve factors set forth in Town Law § 
267-b(3)(b)”52; rather, the ZBA based its determination 
on the no-longer-followed “practical diffi culty” test.
In John Hatgis, LLC v. DeChance53 the Appellate 
Division, Second Department, affi rmed the trial court’s 
dismissal of petitioner’s claims, holding that the ZBA of 
the Town of Brookhaven properly engaged in the bal-
ancing test prescribed by Town Law § 267–b(3)(b) when 
denying the petitioner’s application for an area vari-
ance to maintain an accessory apartment on the subject 
premises. Rejecting the petitioner’s argument that the 
ZBA failed to satisfactorily address all fi ve statutory 
factors, the court reasoned that “no single statutory 
factor is determinative, but merely one consideration 
in a broader balancing test. Moreover, the ZBA is en-
titled to consider the effect its decision would have as 
precedent.”54
The court also held that the ZBA’s conclusions 
in support of its determination were not arbitrary 
or capricious. Specifi cally, the ZBA’s conclusion that 
the grant of the variance would produce an undesir-
able change in the character of the neighborhood and 
a detriment to nearby properties was based on the 
testimony of the attendees at the public hearing and the 
ZBA’s own familiarity with local conditions; the hard-
ship alleged by the petitioner was self-created, as the 
petitioner acquired the property subject to the restric-
The court found that the futility exception did not 
apply because, although the town attorney has taken 
a position on the issue, no commentary suggests the 
Planning Board has an entrenched position, the Plan-
ning Board had discretion to make the fi nal determina-
tion, and any delay by the administrative body was not 
suffi ciently extreme to justify application of the futility 
exception.47 
The Third Department affi rmed dismissal on 
mootness grounds and noted that the Town violated 
the open meetings law in Ballard v. New York Safety 
Track, LLC.48 The case involved an agreement between 
the Town and owners of a motorcycle safety training 
facility to permit the owners to host certain events 
at the facility in 2013 that were allegedly not among 
the uses authorized by the site plan. The agreement 
expired by its own terms in 2013. The court observed 
that where the passage of time or a change in circum-
stances prevents a court from rendering a decision that 
would effectively determine an actual controversy, the 
claim must be dismissed. Thus, because the agreement 
pertained solely to land uses during 2013 and expired 
at the end of that year, the court ruled that the cause of 
action became moot when the agreement expired. 
Ballard’s ruling on the open meeting law violation 
is summarized above.
The Third Department also affi rmed dismissal 
on mootness grounds in Citizens for St. Patrick’s v. 
City of Watervliet.49 This case involved challenges by 
individuals who opposed a development to the City’s 
SEQRA and rezoning determinations. In 2012, defen-
dant PCP Watervliet, LLC, a subsidiary of defendant 
Nigro Companies, purchased a parcel of property 
containing a church, school and rectory that were no 
longer in use in the City of Watervliet. Nigro petitioned 
the City Council to rezone the parcel from residential 
to commercial, and, following public hearings, the City 
issued a negative declaration and amended its zoning 
map as requested. Individuals then brought a challenge 
alleging that the City failed to comply with SEQRA, 
engaged in illegal spot zoning and violated the Open 
Meetings Law. The trial court granted the defendants’ 
motions for summary judgment.
As a preliminary matter, the court found that 
plaintiffs Carol Falaro and Patrick Falaro presump-
tively established their standing to challenge the City’s 
determinations because their residence is located across 
the street from Nigro’s parcel and they will suffer direct 
harm different from the general public, even without 
allegations of individual harm.
But, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ challenges 
to the SEQRA and rezoning determinations were moot 
because they did not seek any injunctive relief from 
the Court during the pendency of the appeal, and the 
church buildings had been demolished and a grocery 
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demonstrates that the ZBA did make 
specifi c factual fi ndings supporting its 
determination.… Although the evi-
dence as to the statutory factors seems 
somewhat evenly split, courts do not 
engage in their own balancing of the 
factors, but must yield to the ZBA’s dis-
cretion and weighing of the evidence.57 
In People, Inc. v City of Tonawanda Zoning Bd. of 
Appeals,58 the Appellate Division, Fourth Department 
reversed the trial court, which had granted the develop-
er petitioner’s CPLR article 78 petition. The court held 
that substantial evidence in the record supported the 
ZBA’s conclusion that granting two requested area vari-
ances would cause increased population density from 
the presence of an apartment building in a neighbor-
hood comprised of single-family homes, that the vari-
ances necessary to accommodate an apartment building 
would be substantial, and that the petitioners’ diffi culty 
was self-created because they were aware of the prop-
erty’s zoning classifi cation when they purchased the 
property. Because the board reviewed the prescribed 
statutory factors in making its determination, and 
rendered its determination after properly weighing the 
benefi t to petitioners against the detriment to the health, 
safety and welfare of the neighborhood or community 
if the variances were granted, the court concluded that 
the action taken by the Board was not illegal, arbitrary 
or capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
In April 2015, the Appellate Division, Third Depart-
ment, in Nemeth v. Village of Hancock Zoning Board 
of Appeals,59 overruled the lower court, ruling that the 
ZBA should not have granted a use variance where the 
respondent’s proof consisted of bare conclusory state-
ments that their business would fail without a use vari-
ance. Petitioners in the case owned property adjacent 
to the property owned by the respondents, on which 
the respondents operated an industrial manufactur-
ing business as a nonconforming use. The respondent 
property owners had applied for and received a use 
variance from respondent Village of Hancock ZBA, al-
lowing the continued use of an addition in the manu-
facturing process made in 2001 after a zoning code was 
enacted prohibiting manufacturing in the zone where 
the property was located. The lower court dismissed 
the petitioner’s claim.
The court fi rst discussed that an applicant for a use 
variance bears the burden of demonstrating, among 
other things, that the property cannot yield a reasonable 
return if used for any of the purposes permitted as it is 
currently zoned. Such an inability to yield a reasonable 
return must be established through the submission of 
“dollars and cents” proof with respect to each permit-
ted use. In this case, however, respondent’s proof con-
sisted of conclusory statements that an additional “10 to 
20 percent” of revenue would be needed to fi nd a simi-
tion; and, the ZBA’s conclusion that a feasible alterna-
tive to the variance existed was supported by the fact 
that the petitioner could have easily reduced the size of 
the accessory apartment. The court also noted with-
out explanation that the ZBA’s determination that the 
requested variance was substantial was not arbitrary 
or capricious. 
In another case involving area variances (and 
standing), Fund for Lake George, Inc. v. Town of 
Queensbury Zoning Bd. of Appeals,55 the Appel-
late Division, Third Department affi rmed the ZBA’s 
determination that the petitioner, an engineering fi rm 
with no discernible connection to the project at issue, 
lacked standing to challenge the ZBA’s granting of area 
variances to a residential property owner, and found 
that the ZBA had a rational basis for granting the area 
variances. In order to facilitate the construction of a 
residence on the subject property, respondents applied 
to the ZBA for area variances requesting relief from 
requirements regarding removal of vegetation and 
setbacks for stormwater infi ltration devices. The ZBA 
granted the variances. The petitioner, a professional 
engineer who claimed to be representing a number 
of neighbors opposed to the project, requested and 
received determinations from the Town’s zoning ad-
ministrator on a number of issues, and appealed to the 
ZBA, which dismissed the appeal for lack of standing. 
Since neither the petitioner nor his fi rm (which 
was listed on the notice of appeal as appellant) exhib-
ited any specialized harm and did not own property 
near the subject property, and the petitioner failed to 
identify the neighbors he claimed to represent, the 
court found that the petitioner did not have standing 
in his individual capacity or as an agent for his fi rm. 
The court based its holding on its interpretation of a 
Town Code provision that permits appeals by “any 
person aggrieved” by, among other things, the zoning 
administrator’s decisions. The court found that this 
language appears to have been taken from Town Law 
§ 267–a(4), which “has been consistently interpreted to
mean a person who has sustained special damage, dif-
ferent in kind and degree from the community gener-
ally,” which can be shown “if he or she falls within the 
statute’s zone of interests and his or her property is 
suffi ciently proximate to the property at issue.”56 
Despite the petitioner’s lack of standing, the court 
went on to consider the merits, noting that, although 
the ZBA’s resolution failed to set forth specifi c factual 
fi ndings, the ZBA’s decision to grant the area variances 
had a rational basis because the resolution and hearing 
minutes show that the ZBA engaged in the statutorily 
prescribed balancing test. The court reasoned that 
[W]e need not annul the determina-
tion or remit the matter if the record, 
including the ZBA’s formal return 
in the CPLR article 78 proceeding, 
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12 people. As such, it is manifest that 
a residential conversion would not 
yield a reasonable rate of return, such 
that specifi c dollars and cents proof 
for a residential option is simply 
unnecessary.61 
Judge Lynch also noted that the ZBA could have 
rationally concluded that the property was unique 
and the proposed use would not alter the character of 
the neighborhood, because the property contained a 
long-standing, nonconforming industrial use that had 
included the addition since 2001, and that the hardship 
was not self-imposed because the Kuehns purchased 
the property before the Village enacted its zoning code. 
In Traendly v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of 
Southold,62 the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment held that the denial by the ZBA of the petitioners’ 
application for area and lot-width variances to build 
a single-family dwelling had a rational basis and was 
supported by evidence in the record. The court over-
ruled the trial court, which had granted the applicant’s 
Article 78 petition, annulled the ZBA’s determination, 
and directed the ZBA to grant the application.
Without discussion of the record evidence, the 
court found that the granting of the variances would 
have resulted in the creation of “the most nonconform-
ing lot in a unique neighborhood,”63 the requested vari-
ances were substantial, and the petitioners’ hardship 
was self-created. The court also found that the ZBA’s 
granting of a particular prior application for an area 
variance did not constitute a precedent from which the 
ZBA was required to explain a departure, because the 
petitioners had failed to establish that the prior appli-
cation bore suffi cient factual similarity to the subject 
application. 
Vested Rights
In Cobleskill Stone Products, Inc. v. Town of Scho-
harie,64 the Appellate Division, Third Department, held 
that the failure to obtain a special permit does not pre-
clude the ability to establish a vested right to mine on 
property. The petitioner in this case operated a quarry 
in the Town of Schoharie, which had been in operation 
since the 1890s. Pursuant to respondent Town of Scho-
harie’s 1975 zoning ordinance, “commercial excava-
tion or mining” was a permitted use upon receipt of a 
special permit from the Town. Petitioner purchased an 
additional parcel of real property to the south of the 
areas that it actively mined, and then commenced this 
combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory 
judgment action seeking a judgment declaring that it 
had a vested right to quarry as a preexisting noncon-
forming use under Local Law No. 2 and any subse-
quently enacted prohibitory zoning amendment. 
larly sized location to house the equipment and that 
“we would go out of business” without the addition. 
Because there was insuffi cient proof, the court held that 
the ZBA should not have granted the variance.
Judge Lynch wrote a dissenting opinion, noting 
that “[j]udicial review of a zoning board determination 
is limited to an examination of whether it has a rational 
basis and is supported by substantial evidence,”60 and 
arguing that the determination here met this standard. 
In an instance, as here, where a use 
variance is required to expand a 
nonconforming use the applicant must 
demonstrate that the land cannot yield 
a reasonable return if used as it then 
exists or for any other use allowed in 
the zone. As such,…[t]he core ques-
tion remains whether respondents 
established that the property could 
not yield a reasonable rate of return 
without utilizing the addition in the 
manufacturing process, or otherwise 
utilizing the entire parcel for residen-
tial purposes.… In considering the 
property as it then exists,…we must 
account for the fact that the addition 
had been utilized in the manufacturing 
process since 2001, until precluded by 
this Court’s decision in 2012. Respon-
dent [ZBA]…concluded that the cost of 
converting the addition to a residential 
use, relocating the facility and/or shut-
ting down manufacturing in the ad-
dition demonstrated that respondents 
could not realize a reasonable return 
on the property without a use variance 
for the addition. The ZBA relied upon 
documented proof…that a renovation 
of the addition for residential use…
would cost over $160,000, resulting in 
a net monthly loss of $333. In addition, 
the Delaware County Department of 
Economic Development estimated 
the cost of relocating the manufactur-
ing facility at between $1.5 and $2.2 
million. [Respondent] Perry Kuehn 
testifi ed that, without the addition, 
respondents would have to conduct 
part of the manufacturing process in 
a separate location off site, resulting 
in an estimated 10% to 20% extra cost 
that would put them out of business. 
Moreover, as a practical matter, given 
the prohibitive cost of relocating the 
manufacturing facility, a conversion 
of the entire property to a residential 
use would effect a closure of the busi-
ness, which employs approximately 
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suffi cient. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.
Justice Sotomayor wrote for the Court 
and interpreted the “in writing” and 
“substantial evidence” requirements to 
require reasons to be given for judi-
cial review purposes. … [The Court 
explained that [t]he use of “substantial 
evidence” in the TCA was a “term of 
art,” describing how an administrative 
record was to be reviewed by a court 
under the TCA. The Court inferred 
that Congress required fi ndings to be 
derived from the administrative pro-
cess, rejecting the City’s contention that 
this requirement would deprive it of 
its local zoning authority [and] fi nding 
that Congress meant to interfere with 
local zoning processes to this extent, 
but stressing that the reasons need not 
be elaborate—just suffi ciently clear to 
enable judicial review.
Moreover, the Court determined that 
the TCA did not require that the rea-
sons be found in the decision or be in 
any particular form, as the TCA stated 
it did not otherwise affect the authority 
of a local zoning authority…. However, 
the Court did [fi nd that the TCA’s text 
and structure] require that the reasons 
be given either in the decision or es-
sentially contemporaneous with the 
same. By waiting until 26 days after 
its decision to issue detailed approved 
minutes, the City failed its statutory 
obligations and the decision of the 
Eleventh Circuit was reversed.
Justice Alito concurred, adding that it 
would be suffi cient for the City to state 
simply that the proposal was “estheti-
cally incompatible with the surround-
ing area,” [and] that plaintiff was not 
injured by the City’s delay in providing 
the fi nal version of the minutes (which 
he viewed as harmless error)….
Chief Justice Roberts authored a dis-
sent, in which Justices Ginsburg and 
Thomas joined, stating that, while 
fi ndings or reasons for the decision 
were required, they need not be issued 
“essentially contemporaneously” with 
the decision, as such a requirement was 
not in the TCA, noting that Congress 
has in other legislation, such as the 
Administrative Procedures Act and 
other sections of the TCA itself, made 
On appeal from the Supreme Court’s order grant-
ing the petitioner’s motion for partial summary judg-
ment, the Third Department reasoned that, although 
a special permit was required for mining operations 
between 1975 and 2005, petitioner’s failure to ob-
tain one did not, as a matter of law, preclude it from 
establishing that it had a vested right to mine on its 
property notwithstanding a current or future prohibi-
tive zoning ordinance. Because of this, the court found 
the Supreme Court erred in granting partial summary 
judgment to respondents dismissing the vested right 
cause of action based on petitioner’s failure to obtain a 
special permit pursuant to the 1975 zoning ordinance. 
Additionally, the court found that the Supreme Court’s 
judgment, partially granting the petition and annulling 
Local Law No. 2, did not render the appeal moot, be-
cause, if a new zoning ordinance with the same prohi-
bition against mining were to be enacted, a declaration 
that petitioner had a vested right as against the earlier 
law would affect the rights of the parties. Accordingly, 
the court dismissed the order of the Supreme Court.
Wireless Broadband 
Patricia Salkin’s Law of the Land blog65 provided 
an excellent summary of a January 2015 U.S. Supreme 
Court opinion on the Telecommunications Act’s “in 
writing” requirement for land use decisions relating to 
the siting of cell towers, as follows: 
T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of 
Roswell[66] was a case brought by a 
“personal wireless service provider” 
under the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 (TCA) which, among other 
things, supported rapid deployment 
of personal communications devices 
(e.g., cell phones) by requiring that 
land use decisions on matters relating 
to such things as cell towers be “in 
writing” and supported by substantial 
evidence from a written record. In this 
case defendant City denied plain-
tiff’s cell tower application by letter, 
informing plaintiff that it could fi nd 
the reasons for the denial in the City 
Council minutes. There was a 30-day 
appeal period under the TCA; how-
ever, the City’s draft minutes were 
not approved until four days before 
the appeal period ran. Nevertheless, 
plaintiff challenged the denial in fed-
eral court on the “in writing” require-
ment and also alleged the denial was 
not supported by substantial evidence. 
The trial court found for the plaintiff 
but the Eleventh Circuit, following a 
majority of circuits, found the letter 
and reference to the minutes to be 
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TCA, local governments retain authority over “deci-
sions regarding the placement, construction, and modi-
fi cation of personal wireless service facilities,” but may 
not “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provi-
sion of personal wireless services.”68 The fi rst prong of 
the Willoth effective prohibition test, which requires a 
plaintiff to establish that a signifi cant gap in wireless 
coverage exists, was satisfi ed by the defendants’ conces-
sion of that fact. The second prong of the test recognizes 
that a local government may deny an applicant’s pro-
posal if an applicant may “select a less sensitive site,…
reduce the tower height,…use a preexisting structure 
or…camoufl age the tower and/or antennae.”69 The 
court found that the second prong was also satisfi ed be-
cause the record demonstrated that the plaintiffs evalu-
ated alternative locations and the Board’s denial of the 
plaintiffs’ application left the plaintiffs with no feasible 
means of fi lling the gap in wireless coverage. 
The court then found that the Board’s denial of the 
application on the grounds that the proposed tower 
would lower property values was not supported by 
substantial evidence and ordered the Board to grant 
the application. The record showed that the proposed 
site was near four large ham radio towers in the neigh-
borhood and the neighbors opposing the application 
acknowledged that the towers existed at the time they 
purchased their homes. 
Written Requests (Town Law)
In another case involving a failed attempt to rely on 
board minutes as a writing, Smith v. Stephens Media 
Group-Watertown, LLC,70 the Appellate Division, 
Fourth Department held that the written record of an 
oral request in the minutes of a town board meeting 
was not suffi cient to satisfy the written request require-
ment set forth in Town Law § 268(2). The plaintiff land-
owners commenced this action seeking enforcement 
of the Town of Rutland Code § 130–48(E)(1)(g), which 
requires that “the minimum setback distance of a com-
munications tower from all property lines shall be equal 
to 100% of the height of the communications tower.” 
The plaintiffs alleged that the size of the parcel owned 
by the defendant was insuffi cient to permit its 370–foot 
radio transmission tower to meet the minimum setback 
distance. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief enjoin-
ing the alleged violation.
The appellate court found that the court below 
erred in denying the part of the defendant’s motion 
seeking summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ 
claim pursuant to Town Law § 268(2), which provides 
“upon the failure or refusal of the proper local offi cer, 
board or body of the town to institute [any appropriate 
action or proceedings to prevent or restrain the viola-
tion of its zoning laws] for a period of ten days after 
written request by a resident taxpayer of the town so 
to proceed, any three taxpayers of the town who are 
jointly or severally aggrieved by such violation, may 
such a specifi c requirement. Moreover, 
the dissent observed that the “sole 
issue” before the court was the “in 
writing” requirement and not the tim-
ing of the fi ndings, an issue not raised 
below. While agreeing that fi ndings 
were implicitly required by the use of 
the “substantial evidence” standard, if 
they were not given or [were] inad-
equate, remand would be justifi ed, 
rejecting the contention that plaintiff 
needed to see the reasons in order to 
decide whether to appeal[.]
Finally, the dissent suggests that im-
pacts of this case on local governments 
will be “small”—they need only hold 
back the fi nal decision until the min-
utes [are] transcribed or reasons given.
It appears the entire Court would con-
clude that the TCA requires reasons 
for a land use decision involving cell 
towers; however, the justices dis-
agree on the required timing of those 
reasons. This result may come as a 
surprise for some local governments.
In Orange County-Poughkeepsie Limited Part-
nership v. Town of Fishkill,67 the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York found that the 
plaintiffs Orange County–Poughkeepsie Limited 
Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless and Homeland 
Towers, LLC satisfi ed their obligation to make an effort 
to evaluate alternative locations for a communications 
tower, the Board’s denial of the plaintiffs’ application 
for a special permit left the plaintiffs with no feasible 
means of fi lling the gap in wireless coverage, and 
the Board’s denial of the application on grounds that 
the proposed 150-foot tall monopole wireless facility 
would decrease property values was not supported by 
substantial evidence. 
In this case, Verizon had sought to construct a new 
wireless telecommunications facility within an R-1 
Residential Zoning District. Under the Town of East 
Fishkill’s Zoning Code, a special permit was required 
for the construction of a wireless communication facil-
ity within the residential zoning district and the maxi-
mum height of a freestanding tower in a residential 
area was 110 feet. The plaintiffs submitted a joint ap-
plication for a special permit with requests for a 40-foot 
height variance. The Board retained a wireless con-
sultant, which advised the Board that “the proposed 
site only provides approximately 20% new coverage 
(un-duplicated) and nearly 80% overlaps with existing 
coverage,” and denied the application.
The court began by granting summary judgment 
on the plaintiffs’ effective prohibition claim. Under the 
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single lot as long as they do not exceed 
the density limitations.73
The court also considered and rejected arguments 
that the Town had provided inadequate notice of 
proposed Local Law No. 8 (which amended the zoning 
ordinance to create a business district covering an area 
that contains the Country Club Acres parcel) and that 
the failure of the town to update its zoning map, which 
is unoffi cial and available merely as a reference tool, 
invalidated the local law. The court therefore reversed 
the dismissal of the petitioner Boni Enterprises’ claims 
and declared that the Town Code does not prohibit 
Boni Enterprises from constructing multiple one-family 
dwellings on a single lot in the B–1 district, Local Law 
No. 8 was properly enacted, and petitioner Country 
Club Acres’ parcel is located in the zoning districts as 
set forth by Local Law No. 8.
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institute such appropriate action or proceeding in like 
manner as such local offi cer, board or body of the town 
is authorized to do.” The court explained that, because 
the written record of their oral request in the minutes 
of the town board meeting did not satisfy the require-
ment of a written request and the plaintiffs failed to 
show that they made any other written request con-
templated by the statute, they “failed to satisfy a condi-
tion precedent to maintaining their claim pursuant 
to the statute.”71 The plaintiff’s appeal was therefore 
dismissed, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss was 
granted.
Zoning Interpretation 
In Boni Enterprises, LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Ap-
peals of Town of Clifton Park,72 the Appellate Divi-
sion, Third Department held the ZBA erred in fi nd-
ing that the Town Code prohibited petitioners Boni 
Enterprises, LLC and Country Club Acres, Inc. from 
constructing 74 one-family dwellings. Petitioners, who 
owned contiguous parcels of property in the Town of 
Clifton Park, submitted a revised application for site 
plan review to the planning board, outlining a plan 
to build 74 dwellings and 15 commercial buildings. 
The Planning Board contended that it was unable to 
consider the application because the Town’s Zoning 
Enforcement Offi cer concluded that there were zoning 
issues with petitioners’ site plan and the ZBA agreed 
that the town code prohibited construction of multiple 
single-family dwellings on the Boni Enterprises parcel. 
Petitioners responded with a combined CPLR article 78 
proceeding and action for declaratory judgment.
The court fi rst noted that the lower court erred in 
granting deference to the ZBA because no deference is 
allowed if the issue is one of pure legal interpretation 
of the zoning law. The court then found that, pursu-
ant to the town code’s defi nitions of “dwelling” and 
“building,” the word “buildings” in the code provision 
that allows “[m]ultiple buildings on a lot” includes 
one-family dwellings. The court noted, 
[T]he words building and dwelling are 
not synonymous and cannot be used 
interchangeably, because a dwelling is 
a subset of the broader term building. 
Stated another way, not every building 
is a dwelling, but every dwelling is a 
building. We agree with respondents 
that respondent Town of Clifton Park 
probably never envisioned a landown-
er being able to build 74 one-family 
dwellings on a single, unsubdivided 
parcel in a business district. Neverthe-
less, the plain language of the Town 
Code, strictly construed against the 
municipality, must be interpreted as 
permitting multiple buildings—in-
cluding one-family dwellings—on a 
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